The 9-11 Commission Report Is On The Web

The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Against The United States web site is up, and the executive summary and full report have been posted. There's a lot to read. Obviously, I haven't read it all yet. From what I have, however, I think it may the single most objective and non-partisan (from a US national politics point of view) document,to come from any political/governmental body in my lifetime and possibly in much longer than that. It may prove to be one of the most historically important documents that we will see in our lifetimes. I have to wonder: are we as a nation and as a people up to the challenge of maintaining the objectivity and non-partisan spirit that this Commission has established long enough to see ourselves through implementation of their recommendations? I hope so.

Here are some key excerpts from the public statement of the Chair and Vice Chair that accompanies the report:

On September 11, 2001, 19 men armed with knives, box-cutters, mace and pepper spray penetrated the defenses of the most powerful nation in the world. They inflicted unbearable trauma on our people, and turned the international order upside down. We ask each of you to remember how you felt that day—the grief, the enormous sense of loss. We also came together that day as a nation—young and old, rich and poor, Republicans and Democrats. We all had a deep sense of hurt. We also had a deep sense of purpose. We knew what we had to do, as a nation, to respond. And we did.

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The United States government was simply not active enough in combating the terrorist threat before 9/11.

o Our diplomacy and foreign policy failed to extricate bin Laden from his Afghan sanctuary.

o Our military forces and covert action capabilities did not have the options on the table to defeat al Qaeda or kill or capture bin Laden and his chief lieutenants.

o Our intelligence and law-enforcement agencies did not manage or share information, or effectively follow leads, to keep pace with a nimble enemy.

o Our border, immigration, and aviation security agencies were not integrated into the counterterrorism effort; and

o Much of our response on the day of 9/11 was improvised and ineffective, even as extraordinary individual acts of heroism saved countless lives.

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Our failure took place over many years and Administrations. There is no single individual who is responsible for this failure. Yet individuals and institutions are not absolved of responsibility. Any person in a senior position within our government during this time bears some element of responsibility for the government’s actions. It is not our purpose to assign blame. As we said at the outset, we look back so that we can look forward. Our goal is to prevent future attacks. Every expert with whom we spoke told us that an attack of even greater magnitude is now possible--and even probable. We do not have the luxury of time. We must prepare and we must act.

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There is no silver bullet or decisive blow that can defeat Islamist terrorism. It will take unity of effort and sustained and effective use of every tool at our disposal:

o We need to play offense: kill or capture terrorists; deny them sanctuaries; and disrupt their ability to move money and people around the globe.

o We need to ensure that key countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are stable, capable, and resolute in opposing terrorism.

o We need to sustain a coalition of nations that cooperates bilaterally and multilaterally with us in the counterterrorism mission. We need a better dialogue between the West and the Islamic world. We also highlight the need to restrict and roll back the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.

o We need to put forth an agenda of opportunity – economic, educational, and political – so that young people in the Arab and Islamic world have peaceful and productive avenues for expression and hope.

o We need to join the battle of ideas within the Islamic world: communicating hope instead of despair, progress in place of persecution, life instead of death. This message should be matched by policies that encourage and support the majority of Muslims who share these goals.

o At home, we need to set clear priorities for the protection of our infrastructure, and the security of our transportation. Resources should be allocated based upon those priorities, and standards of preparedness should be set. The private sector and local governments should play an important part of this process.

o We need secure borders, with heightened and uniform standards of identification for those entering and exiting the country; and an immigration system able to be efficient, allowing good people in while keeping terrorists out.

o If, God forbid, there is another attack, we must be ready to respond. We must educate the public, train and equip our first responders, and anticipate countless scenarios.

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Thus we are recommending:

-- A National Counterterrorism Center. We need unity of effort on counterterrorism. We should create a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to unify all counterterrorism intelligence and operations across the foreign-domestic divide in one organization. Right now, these efforts are too diffuse across the government. They need to be unified.

-- A National Intelligence Director. We need unity of effort in the Intelligence Community. We need a much stronger head of the Intelligence Community, and an intelligence community that organizes itself to do joint work in national mission centers. We need reforms of the kind the military had two decades ago. We need a “Goldwater-Nichols” reform for the intelligence community. The intelligence community needs a shift in mindset and organization, so that intelligence agencies operate under the principle of joint command, with information-sharing as the norm.

-- Reform in the Congress. We need unity of effort in the Congress. Right now, authority and responsibility are too diffuse. The Intelligence Committees do not have enough power to perform their oversight work effectively. Oversight for Homeland Security is splintered among too many Committees. We need much stronger committees performing oversight of intelligence. We need a single committee in each chamber providing oversight of the Department of Homeland Security.

-- Reform in the FBI. We need a stronger national security workforce within the FBI. We do not support the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency. What the FBI needs is a specialized and integrated national security workforce, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists and surveillance specialists. These specialists need to be recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture with deep expertise in intelligence and national security.

-- Changes in Information Sharing. We need unity of effort in information sharing. The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using that information. “Need to share” must replace “need to know.”

-- Transitions. We need a better process for transitions involving national security officials, so that this Nation does not lower its guard every four or eight years. These, and other, recommendations are spelled out in great detail in our report. We have made a limited number of recommendations, focusing on the areas we believe most critical.

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We are acutely sensitive to the need to vigorously protect our liberties as we guard our security. We endorse many of the actions taken in the wake of 9/11 to facilitate government action and information sharing. But we stress that these measures need to be accompanied by a commitment to our open society and the principle of review – safeguards that are built into the process, and vigorous oversight. We must, after all is said and done, preserve the liberties that we are fighting for.

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On that beautiful September day, we felt deep hurt, but we believed and acted as one nation. We united as Americans have always united in the face of a common foe. Five Republicans and five Democrats have come together today with that same unity of purpose. We file no additional views. We have no dissents. We have each decided that we will play no active role in the fall presidential campaign. We will, instead, work together in support of the recommendations in this report. We believe that in acting together, we can make a difference. We can make our nation safer and more secure.